In this paper we apply meta-analysis to a sample of 64 empirical studies to identify the potential moderators to the relationship between board, audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure. We examine whether the results are affected by the differences in the construction of disclosure index, the type of voluntary disclosure, the method of disclosure, the definitions of variables relating to corporate governance, the level of investor protection, and country geographic location. We find that, whilst board size, board composition and audit committee have a significant positive effect on voluntary disclosure, CEO duality has a significant negative effect. In addition, country geographic location moderates the association between board size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure is moderated by disclosure type, disclosure method and the level of investor protection. Finally, differences in the definitions of explanatory variables moderate the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure. We conduct a sensitivity analysis which provides evidence that, in respect of the time period, prior to 2002, CEO duality has a significant negative effect on voluntary disclosure and has an insignificant effect for the period thereafter.
The impact of board and audit committee characteristics on voluntary disclosure: a meta-analysis
Introduction
Although disclosure theories suggest a positive association between corporate governance and disclosure, empirical research offers mixed results (Wang & Hussainey, 2013) . Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011:153) note that since the literature on corporate governance "already has a degree of maturity, most improvements will be incremental". Generally, empirical evidence is restricted to only one country and, consequently, this may reduce the capability to ascertain and generalize the research findings which limits the theoretical development of this research area. To gain a better understanding of the association between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, we conduct a meta-analysis of 64 empirical studies 1 . Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004: 319 & 320) state that, "In the debate over director
efficacy, prior literature primarily focuses on four board characteristics; (i) board independence, (ii) board size, (iii) committee structure, and (iv) specific occupational
characteristics or expertise of independent directors". The worldwide codes of best practice recommend that a corporation should have a large and independent board of directors;
separate roles for the chairman and CEO; and a large and independent audit committee (Gregory, 2009) . Given this importance, we focus on these governance attributes 2 .
For this paper, our motivation is to reconcile the inconsistent research findings and draw logical conclusions which are not obvious from narrative reviews. Narrative reviews suffer 1 64 studies as compared to the 27 studies in García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) . 2 In order to assess meta-analytically the effect of internal governance attributes on voluntary disclosure, it is necessary to have a sufficiently large number of studies which address empirically a particular research question. Our decision to focus on specific mechanisms is influenced by this criterion. Initially, we look for other board characteristics including the number of meetings and the percentage of financial expertise. However, given the limited number of studies, we discard these variables in order to obtain robust meta-analytic findings.
from a lack of acceptable rules to extend the individual results to generalized findings.
Therefore, these can lead to false conclusions since, generally, the differences of the significance across studies are attributed to the sampling errors (Rosenthal, 1991) .
Our paper offers three novel contributions. First, when compared to Pomeroy and Thornton's (2008) and García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta's (2010) studies, we offer distinguishing features. Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) focus on the independence of audit committee whilst
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) examine board independence and ownership concentration. We complement this line of research by considering several corporate governance attributes (board size, board composition, CEO duality and audit committee).
Second, by focusing on intellectual, social, environmental and internet disclosures, we are motivated by García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010:622) who call for "new analyses, studying for example whether the results depend on the type of voluntary information reported (social, environmental, intellectual capital, etc.) ". Finally, we examine whether disclosure index construction, disclosure method, the definition of explanatory variables and research settings 2 moderate the results reported in the empirical literature.
Our meta-analytic findings show that country geographic location moderates the association between board size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. In addition, we find that the level of investor protection, the type and the method of disclosure affect the relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. Finally, we document that the proxies used to measure explanatory variables moderate the relationship between board composition and voluntary disclosure.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data collection. Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes. 2 We use an updated classification of countries and investor protection ranking.
Agency theory suggests that the existence of independent directors on the board may have a significant impact on the effectiveness of board's monitoring activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Based on the reputation effect, Patelli and Principe (2007) argue that, by providing more voluntary disclosure, outside directors may gain greater public esteem to build their reputations as expert monitors in the labor market. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) use the 'domino effect' concept of independent directors to push inside board members to improve corporate reporting policy through more voluntary disclosure.
By contrast, Patelli and Principe (2007) suggest that outside directors are normally appointed by dominant shareholders. In case of collusion with them, the monitoring role of independent directors will be limited (Demb & Neubauer, 1992) . Under these conditions, the presence of a high proportion of outside directors may have a negative effect on voluntary disclosure.
The empirical evidence on the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure is inconclusive. While Adams and Hossain (1998) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find a significant positive association between voluntary disclosure and board composition, Abdelsalam and Street (2007) and Eng and Mak (2003) document a negative association between both variables. Therefore, we formulate the following non-directional hypothesis:
H2: There is an association between board composition and voluntary disclosure.
CEO Duality
A combined leadership structure may facilitate CEO entrenchment (Pfeffer, 1981) and it is considered as the primary cause of the misalignment of interests (Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, & Lee, 2008) . On the one hand, Fama and Jensen's agency framework (1983) indicates that a unified leadership structure reduces the importance of the separation between decision control (chair of the board) and decision management (CEO). Accordingly, CEO duality may constrain the desired system of checks and balances and compromise the board independence in overseeing top management behavior (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007) . On the other hand, the CEO has a superior knowledge of the private information dealing with the firm's competitive advantages and its internal conditions. Therefore, duality may limit the complete transfer of private information between the CEO and board members resulting in less voluntary disclosure (Kim et al., 2008) .
However, Anderson and Anthony (1986) point out that duality enables a clear-cut leadership in the formulation and the implementation of firm's strategy and this leads to greater efficiency. They argue that a unified leadership structure reduces information sharing costs and conflict of interests between CEO and non-CEO chairman. Proponents of duality also highlight the importance of clear lines of authority and unity of commend to reduce conflicts and improve decision making (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramuthy, 2001) . Therefore, CEO duality may result in more voluntary disclosure.
We also note that the empirical evidence on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and CEO duality is mixed. Whilst Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Li et al. (2008) document a significantly negative association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure, other studies (e.g. Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) report an insignificant or a positive association between both variables. Therefore, we formulate the following nondirectional hypothesis:
H3: There is an association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure.
Audit Committee
The key role of audit committee is to assist the board of directors in overseeing corporate reporting policy (Pincus, Rusbarsky, & Wong, 1989) . For instance, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) suggest that, in terms of clarity, relevance and completeness of information an audit committee plays a crucial role in fulfilling investors' needs for information. As a control mechanism over top management, an audit committee ensures that there is an increased voluntary disclosure to allow an accurate assessment of the top management's decisions and behaviors (Allegrini & Greco, 2013) and align the management's and the shareholders'
interests (Laksmana, 2008) . Therefore, such a monitoring mechanism is expected to improve corporate reporting policy. For instance, The Blue Ribbon Report (1999) and the Smith Report (2003) suggest that the audit committee plays a pivotal role in monitoring board activities by improving the quality of the disclosed information and ensuring the protection of shareholders' interests through the release of price-sensitive information.
Generally, we note that empirical studies are supportive of a positive association between audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; Barako et al. 2006 and Ho & Wong, 2001 ). By contrast, some studies do not find such an association (e.g. Allegrini & Greco, 2013 and Mangena & Pike, 2005) . Therefore, we formulate the following non-directional hypothesis:
H4: There is an association between audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure.
Variables intervening in the association between board, audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure
By considering the potential moderators to the relationship between governance attributes and voluntary disclosure, we move beyond a simple statistical summary of the association between them. Six potential moderators are successively discussed below.
First, we identify three types of voluntary disclosure scores; total, social, environmental and intellectual capital disclosures. Total disclosure includes different types of information such as historical, financial, social, environmental and intellectual capital information. Total voluntary disclosure is oriented specifically towards stock markets participants and improves investors' abilities to predict future earnings (Gelb & Zarowin, 2002) . The main part of total disclosure score deals with historical financial information (Lim, Matollcky, & Chow, 2007) .
Intellectual capital information targets, also, investors' needs since it deals with the firm's future prospects and provides both strategic and competitive advantage information (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995) . By contrast, social and environmental disclosure is dominated by information concerning firms' social and environmental actions. Therefore, this kind of information is reserved specifically to satisfy stakeholders' needs and signal firm's legitimacy in its society (Lim et al., 2007) .
Since these three types of disclosure integrate different aspects of information and target diverse users of information, different factors are expected to influence each type of information (Lim et al, 2007) . This is particularly true for the board of directors which is, generally, aligned with shareholders and focuses on the maximization of profits rather than serving stakeholders' interests (Adams, Licht, & Sagiv, 2011 Given the fact that, generally, audit committee and board members are considered as representative of shareholders' interests (Ayuso & Argandona, 2007) , they are more likely to be in line with investors' needs and put more emphasis on financial and strategic information.
By contrast, the CEO, who is, also, the chair of the board, will try to reduce financial disclosure to preserve his/her dominant position on the board and facilitate his/her entrenchment. In addition, the proprietary costs theory predicts that CEO will try, also, to reduce the extent of social and environmental disclosure in order to improve the firm's performance in the short term and increase his/her own compensation. Fifth, we note that there is no definitive theoretical guidance concerning how to construct a disclosure index and, consequently, researchers develop the index often based on their objectives (Artiach & Clarkson, 2011) . Whilst some researchers use a dummy variable approach to measure voluntary disclosure, others estimate the extent of voluntary disclosure using a disclosure checklist. According to Bravo, Abad, and Trombetta (2010) , the second approach is more able to capture the richness of firm's voluntary disclosure policy.
Accordingly, we place studies into two groups to assess the moderating effect of the disclosure index construction on the association between voluntary disclosure and the examined governance attributes. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H9: The construction of the disclosure index intervenes in the relationship between board, audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure.
Finally, we note that prior meta-analyses on the determinants of voluntary disclosure (García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Khlif & Souissi, 2010) , argue that, the differences in the definition of explanatory variables, can affect the hypothesized relationships 3 . The empirical literature uses three main proxies to measure board composition, namely, board independence (e.g. Patelli & Prencipe, 2007) , non-executive directors (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) , and independent non-executive directors (e.g. Ghazali & Weetman, 2006) . Corporate governance literature (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999) suggests that, in substance, executive directors are not so independent. Therefore, we expect that this proxy for board composition is less linked to voluntary disclosure. Similarly, we note that audit committee characteristics are measured using different proxies including the existence of an audit committee, the percentage of independent members and the size of audit committee. This diversity of measures may also moderate the relationship between audit committee and voluntary disclosure. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
The proxies, used to measure board size, board composition and audit committee characteristics, intervene in the relationship between these governance attributes and voluntary disclosure.
Sample of studies included in the meta-analysis
We conduct an extensive search for relevant articles. We collect papers from several accounting and finance journals indexed by Science Direct, EJSEbsco, Blackwell, Springer, Emerald, Inderscience, ABI Inform, and Social Science Research Network (SSRN). Our initial search uses keywords including: "voluntary disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms". The term voluntary is then replaced by "internet-based, intellectual capital and social and environmental". In order to identify the maximum number of empirical studies dealing with such a topic, we replace the word "corporate governance" with "board characteristics", "CEO duality" and "audit committee". We also consult specialized journals of accounting and finance (e.g. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Journal of Management Governance) and references in the collected studies. Initially, we search for several board characteristics including board size, board composition, CEO duality, the number of audit committee meetings, the percentage of financial expertise, and audit committee characteristics. However, we focus only on board size, board composition, CEO duality and audit committee characteristics and we discard the other board characteristics given the limited number of studies allowing us to obtain robust meta-analytic findings.
Our searches yield a total of 64 research articles between 1997 and 2013. (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990) . The meta-analysis technique allows researchers to examine the effect of these different data characteristics on the findings of primary studies (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Rosenthal, 1991) .
Effect size
In meta-analysis, the effect size measures the magnitude of the relationship between two variables. In our study, it represents a metric proxy of the degree of connection between voluntary disclosure and explanatory variables 4 . Meta-analytic data should be analyzed using the following three steps as suggested by Hunter et al. (1982) and Hunter and Schmidt (2000) .
(i) Firstly, the mean correlation ( r ) is calculated as:
where Ni is the sample size and ri, is the Pearson correlation coefficient for study i.
(ii) Secondly, the observed variance ( In order to test for moderating variables and determine whether the observed variance is trivial or higher than expected, a chi-square statistic ( (4)) is used to assess whether the observed variance is due to moderating effects or to some statistical errors. If the computed chi-square statistic is inferior to the tabulated one, the association is considered to be homogeneous and the variation in results across studies is due only to some statistical errors. Nevertheless, if the computed chi-square statistic is significant at the 5 per cent significance level, we conduct further analyses to test for moderators and reduce the heterogeneity in the observed variance.
Moderating factors
We consider six moderating variables. Disclosure score is classified into: total score (TS); intellectual capital disclosure (ICD); and social and environmental disclosure (CSED). As the second moderating factor, we consider annual reports disclosure against internet-based 4 In computing the effect size from the reported statistics, different procedures can be used. When a study reports Pearson's r coefficient, such a statistic is used to calculate the effect size between voluntary disclosure score and explanatory variable. When other statistics such as Student t and Z value are reported, the following formulas are used to compute the effect size 
Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the study's results. In each table, we present, firstly, the results of the overall meta-analysis and, if the homogeneity test is rejected, we conduct refined analyses according to the moderating factors cited above.
Board size
The board size has a mean correlation of 0.193 (Z= 8.137) with a 95 per cent confidence interval between 0.146 and 0.239 (Table 3 A) . Therefore, the results support hypothesis H1.
However, only 41.659 per cent of the observed variance is explained by the sampling error variance. This indicates a high degree of heterogeneity across studies. This is also evident from the significant (p < 0.01) 7 chi-square statistic of 64.810. In order to reduce heterogeneity 8 , we undertake further tests for moderating variables.
When we conduct a sub-group meta-analysis with respect to disclosure type (social and environmental, intellectual and total score disclosures), there remains a significant association regardless the type of disclosure. Similarly, disclosure method (annual report versus webbased) does not moderate the examined relationship. Therefore, we establish that H5 and H6
are not supported. In addition, when the checklist approach is used to measure disclosure score, the relationship is also significant with a mean correlation of 0.192 (Z = 8.152). 
MENA and Sub-Saharan African settings).
Finally, the meta-analytic results show that there is only a significant association between board size and voluntary disclosure when the former is proxied by the number of directors on the board with a mean correlation 0.200 (Z = 8.403), whilst, as measured by a dummy variable (-0.001; Z= -0.026), there is an insignificant association. Therefore, H10 is supported. 7 The tabulated chi-square, with a degree of freedom of (27-1= 26) However, given the limited number of studies for dummy variable group, this result should be interpreted with cautions.
Board composition
As shown in Table 3 When we sub-group studies according to disclosure scores, there is, also, a significant association for total, social, environmental and intellectual capital scores. Therefore, these results do not confirm H5. When we classify studies according to disclosure method (annual report versus web), the findings show that there remains a significant association for webbased disclosure (0.108; Z= 2.469), and annual report disclosure (0.116; Z = 5.596).
Therefore, H6 is rejected. Furthermore, when we conduct a sub-group meta-analysis with respect to disclosure index construction, the findings show a significant mean correlation of 0.125 (Z = 6.076) for the checklist index group. By contrast, the relationship becomes insignificant for the dummy variable index group with a mean correlation of 0.046 (Z = 1.100). Therefore, the construction of disclosure index moderates the relationship and H9 is supported. This result should be interpreted with cautions given the limited number of studies using a dummy variable approach.
Another moderating variable, the definition of board composition, shows that the studies, Insert Table 3 about here
CEO duality
Table 4 (C) shows that there is a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure with a mean correlation of -0.053 (Z = -2.796) and a confidence interval between -0.091 and -0.016. We reject the homogeneity test since 33 per cent of the observed variance is explained by the sampling error variance. This is also evident from the significant (p<0.01) chi-square statistic of 97.581. Therefore, we conduct further analysis to test for the presence of moderating variables.
When we classify studies according to disclosure score, there remains a significant negative association for social and environmental score -0.064 (Z = -3.441) and total score (-0.070; Z= -1.950), while it is insignificant for intellectual capital information (-0.001; Z = -0.020).
Therefore, these results support hypothesis H5. As predicted by the proprietary costs theory, the dissemination of social and environmental information increases disclosure costs. CEO will try to avoid such a type of voluntary disclosure to improve the firm's short term profitability and, thus, his/her own compensation. When we examine the moderating effect of disclosure method, we document that the negative association is maintained for annual report disclosure (-0.061; Z = -2.748), whilst it is insignificant for internet-based disclosure (-0.006; Z = -0.023). Therefore, these results also support hypothesis H6.
Moreover, since there is a significant association for the disclosure checklist method (-0.053; Z = -2.551) and the dummy variable approach (-0.062; Z = -5.428), we conclude that the disclosure construction approach does not moderate the association.
When we examine the moderating effect of the level of investor protection, we find that there is a significantly negative relationship for high investor protection group (-0.081; Z = -3.892), whilst it becomes insignificant for low investor protection group (-0.024; Z = -0.762). Therefore, these results support hypothesis H7. Our findings are consistent with those reported by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) , which suggest that, despite the high quality judicial systems, the litigation process reduces managers' incentives to disclose information.
Similarly, we find that the country geographic location moderates the relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure since there is only a significant negative association for OECD high income countries with a mean correlation of -0.072 (Z= -2.167) and a confidence interval between -0.138 and -0.007. Therefore, these results also confirm hypothesis H9. Therefore, we undertake further analyses to identify moderators.
Audit committee
When we study the moderating effects related to voluntary disclosure, the relationship remains significant regardless the type of disclosure score, the approach used to construct disclosure index and the disclosure method. Therefore, these results do not support hypotheses H5, H6 and H9. The lack of moderation for disclosure type and tool should be interpreted with cautions given the limited number of studies for some disclosure types (social, environmental and intellectual capital information) and internet-based disclosure.
When we sub-group studies according to the proxies used to measure the audit committee variable (the percentage of independent directors, the number of audit committee members and a dummy variable), the association remains significant with mean correlations of 0.105 (Z = 4.039), 0.171 (Z = 3.195) and 0.293 (Z = 6.322) respectively. Therefore, the proxy used to measure the audit committee variable does not moderate the relationship and H10 is rejected.
Finally, we undertake further meta-analytic comparisons by grouping studies according to the level of investor protection and country geographic location. The meta-analytic findings show that, for all the groups, the significant relationships remain. Therefore, the level of investor protection and country geographic location do not moderate the examined relationship and, thus, H7 and H8 are rejected. Here it should be noted that, given the limited number of studies, the results, obtained for Sub-Saharan African and MENA countries, have to be interpreted with cautions.
Insert Table 4 about here
A summary of meta-analytic results is shown in Table 5 .
Insert Table 5 In order to test whether the publication bias influences the conclusions drawn from our metaanalysis, we apply Orwin's (1983) approach to determine the extent of the file drawer problem. This method requires the estimation of the fail-safe N being the number of unreported studies with insignificant results required to reduce the mean effect size to a 11 Although several authors call for the control of endogeneity when examining the association between disclosure and corporate governance attributes (e.g. Core, 2001; Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2003) as for corporate governance and corporate performance, the majority of studies dealing with this stream of research consider corporate governance attributes as a determinant of disclosure policy. Therefore, it is not possible for us to control for reverse causality or endogeneity since primary studies in their models consider voluntary disclosure as a consequence of board and audit committee characteristics. specified criterion 12 . We calculate the fail-safe N when significant associations are reported.
The file drawer analysis indicates the stability of significant results obtained for the overall samples since the fail-safe N ranges from 33 for board size to 14 for CEO duality. When subsamples include a limited number of studies, the computed fail-safe Ns also indicate the stability of the results for audit committee variable (MENA and Sub-Saharan African settings) and board size (Sub-Saharan African settings).
We conduct another sensitivity analysis with respect to the type of items included in the total scores. We identify 14 studies 13 which focus exclusively on financial information in their disclosure index. For board size and audit committee, there remains a significant association for financial information and mixed information scores. By contrast, for board composition, the significantly positive association is maintained only for financial scores (0.132; Z = 3.581), whilst it is insignificant for mixed information scores (0.074; Z = 1.907) with a confidence interval between -0.002 and 0.150. Similarly, there is a significant negative association between total score and CEO duality only for financial scores (-0.097; Z = -3.110), whilst it is insignificant for the mixed information scores (-0.050; Z = -0.810). This sensitivity test also supports hypothesis H5 since disclosure type moderates the association between board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. Moller and Jennions (2001) suggest that the meta-analytic results may be affected by the publication bias since quality journals tend to accept studies with significant results.
Therefore, we divide our overall sample into two groups: (i) quality journals and (ii) low quality journals. The results show that the publication quality does not moderate the relationship between board size, board composition, audit committee and voluntary 12 We calculate the fail-safe N using the following equation:
; K0: the fail-safe N or the number of insignificant, unpublished studies; K: the number of studies included in the meta-analysis; ESk: the effect size of studies included in the analysis and ES0 :the criterion effect size level which would reduce the effect size. 13 The studies which deal exclusively with financial information are as follows: (Adams & Hossain, 1998; Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Apostolou & Nanopoulos, 2009; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Baek et al., 2009; Bujaki & McConomy, 2002; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Juini, 2013; Fleo, 2010; Khodadadi et al., 2010; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Mangena & Tauringana, 2007 and Mohamad & Sulong, 2010). disclosure. By contrast, the publication quality moderates the association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure since the mean correlation accounts for -0.064 (Z = -2.447) for high quality papers, whilst it amounts to -0.044 (Z = -1.599) for low quality journals.
The analyses, presented above, include all the effects from all the studies which may cause a stochastic dependence amongst the observations. In order to address this concern, we use only one observation per study as a sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity meta-analytic findings show that there remains a significant association with a high degree of homogeneity for board size, board composition and audit committee. The mean correlations and chi-square statistics account for (0.207 (Z = 7.561); studies identified as outliers, there is, also, a more significant relationship for CEO duality 14 We identify outliers by using the Huffcutt and Arthur's (1995) sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy statistic (SAMD).
For each study, we compute the SAMD as follows: . The effect size of the study is not considered to be an outlier if it is close to 0 (Huffcutt and Arthur, 1995) . In our analysis, we consider a cut-off point of 1.5. Each study that has a standardized absolute value of SAMD that equals or exceeds 1.5 is considered as outlier and we eliminate it. 15 The studies identified as outliers are as follows: (i) board size (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Gandıa, 2008; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Samaha et al. 2012) ; (ii) Board composition (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Adams & Hossain, 1998; Barako et al., 2006; Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Khan et al, 2013; Mallin et al. 2013; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011) ; (iii) CEO duality (Rouf, 2011; Al-Janadi et al. 2013; Chau & Gray, 2010) and ( homogeneous relationships since the percentage of the observed variance explained by the sampling error variance amounts to 100 per cent for board size, board composition and CEO duality, while it is about 75 per cent for audit committee. Here, it should be noted that the results generated from sub-group meta-analyses remain stable after the exclusion of outliers.
Conclusion
In this meta-analysis, we investigate the link between board size, board composition, CEO duality, audit committee and voluntary disclosure. We also test whether the relationships are moderated by the differences in disclosure type, method and construction; the differences in research setting; and the differences in the measurement of explanatory variables. Our primarily meta-analytic findings show that there is a significant positive association between board size, board composition, audit committee and voluntary disclosure, while CEO duality has a significant negative effect on voluntary disclosure. Our sub-group meta-analytic results provide evidence that country geographic location moderates the association between board size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. In addition, disclosure type, disclosure method and the level of investor protection moderate the association between voluntary disclosure and CEO duality. Finally, differences in the definition of the explanatory variables moderate the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure. Our sensitivity analysis with respect to the time period provides evidence that, prior to 2002, CEO duality has a significantly negative association with voluntary disclosure. However, for the period following 2002, CEO duality has an insignificant effect on voluntary disclosure.
Overall, our meta-analytic findings emphasize the need to explicitly consider the country geographic location when one analyzes the association between board characteristics and voluntary disclosure. In addition, the negative effect of CEO duality on voluntary disclosure is more pronounced in high investor protection settings implying that the litigation process, in high quality judicial systems, reduces managers' incentives to disclose information.
One limitation of our results is the 'apples and oranges' problem caused by the wide range of econometric methodologies used to estimate the effect size. However, recent accounting literature applied largely meta-analysis and our analysis is in line with previous meta-analyses (e.g. García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010) . In addition, the meta-analysis technique represents a simple test of the association between two variables and it does not allow us to control for endogeneity or reverse causality if the primary study does not control such an issue. Since the empirical disclosure studies, included in our meta-analysis, do not address this issue, we find it impossible to control for endogeneity.
Several avenues for future research exist. Firstly, there is a need for more research on the problem of endogeneity between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance. Secondly, since virtually all studies dealing with the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure eliminate financial companies from their samples, it will be interesting to study explicitly, for financial companies, the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure to see if there is a significant difference from those of non-financial companies. Notes: TS: total score; CSED: corporate social and environmental disclosure; ICD: intellectual capital disclosure; IBD: internet-based disclosure; (PID): percentage of independent directors; (PIND): percentage of independent non-executive directors; (PND): percentage of non-executive directors; *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
